ETHNONATIONAL DIASPORA AND DIASPORALE FORMATIONS: ESSENCE AND STRUCTURE

Zalitaylo I.V.

Recently, specialists in various fields of science: ethnologists, historians, political scientists, sociologists, cultural scientists, have become interested in the problem of the national diaspora, where it is considered not as a typical phenomenon of our time, but as a unique sociocultural, historical, ethnopolitical phenomenon.

Despite the widespread use of this term in the scientific literature, the search for the most clear definition of the concept of “diaspora” continues to this day. Many researchers, such as S.V. Lurie, Kolosov V.A., Galkina T.A., Kuibyshev M.V., Poloskova T.V. and others, give their definition of this phenomenon. Some scientists prefer to highlight the distinctive features or characteristic features of the diaspora over a strict definition.

Of course, highlighting these characteristics will help present the diaspora as a unique phenomenon in the culture of modern Russia, but first it should be noted that the phenomenon of diaspora is very complex and therefore there is no generally accepted definition for it. The author of this article is guided by the following definition: diaspora is a stable form of community formed as a result of migrations, living locally or dispersed outside the historical homeland and having the ability to self-organize, the representatives of which are united by such characteristics as group identity, memory of the historical past of their ancestors, culture of the people .

There is no consensus among researchers about which diasporas should be classified as “classical,” “old,” or “worldwide.” So T.I. Chaptykova, exploring the phenomenon of national diaspora in her dissertation, classifies the diasporas of Greeks and Jews as classical peoples in the ancient world, and assigns a significant role to the Armenian, Spanish, and English diasporas “in global socio-cultural progress,” and calls the Armenian “old.” A.G. Vishnevsky considers the Armenian, Jewish, and Greek diasporas as “classical” in terms of duration of existence, as well as meeting the basic criteria of a diaspora. Exploring the phenomenon of “global” diasporas, T. Poloskova points out their main typology-forming features:

Wide distribution area;

Sufficient quantitative potential;

Influence in the field of politics, economics, culture on the development of internal processes;

The presence of institutional structures that provide for the functioning of international diaspora associations;

Independent awareness of a person as a representative of the “world” diaspora.

Based on the presented characteristics, the world diasporas include Jewish, Armenian, Chinese, Greek, Ukrainian, Russian, German, Korean and a number of others. But, in addition to the presented signs of world diasporas, one should indicate such an internal consolidating factor as cohesion, as well as a fairly long period of existence.

The “new” ones include diasporas formed at the end of the 20th century. in Eurasia and Eastern Europe as a result of the collapse of the entire socialist system, namely in the USSR, SFRY, Czechoslovakia.

But in this article we will consider the so-called “new” diasporas that arose in the post-Soviet era and found themselves in connection with the redistribution of state borders, mass migrations, the crisis situation in the socio-economic sphere and a number of other reasons on the territory of Russia. It is important to note that the degree of national self-identification of the titular population of the republics of the former USSR after the redistribution of borders, which took place against the backdrop of further intensification of social movements, as well as in connection with the change of leadership and ideology in the CIS and Baltic countries, increased significantly and became more open. Therefore, until 1991, for Moldovans, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other nationalities who lived for a long time in a single state, the concept of diaspora was abstract. Now new diasporas are in their infancy, although over the last decade their organization has increased significantly, and the scope of their activities has expanded (from culture to politics) and the Ukrainian and Armenian diasporas stand out from others, having become an organic part of the world.

So, the political events of the late 20th century that swept through the countries of the socialist camp and their consequences determined the beginning of the process of formation of “new” diasporas in Russia. And the creation of world diasporas, according to most researchers, was preceded by the following reasons:

Forced relocation to the territory of another state (for example, the Jewish people of Palestine in the 6th century to Babylonia);

Raids of aggressive neighboring tribes, as well as conquest operations of the majestic;

Colonization processes (a classic example is the creation of Greek colonies in the Mediterranean);

Persecution on ethnic and religious grounds;

The search for new trade routes is one of the main reasons for the emergence of the Armenian diaspora;

The long-standing mixing of different peoples concentrated in one geographical area and the impossibility of drawing a clear boundary between them;

Resettlement of ethnic communities at the invitation of governments of states in need of labor and intellectual potential (for example, the German community in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries).

New and recent history has identified a number of other reasons that contributed to the formation of diasporas outside their homeland: - economic transformations that required significant labor resources (USA, Canada, Latin America, India, South Africa, Australia);

Agrarian resettlement; - oppression in public life, often interpreted as ethnic persecution (Poles, Irish, Germans, Italians).

All of the above reasons caused mass migrations of peoples. This fundamental factor allows us to conclude that migration is the basis for the emergence of “global” diasporas. The author of the article devoted to the study of the theoretical and applied aspects of the diaspora, S. Lalluka, also considers migration an essential component of the diaspora. Another researcher, defining the concept of “diaspora,” notes that this ethnic minority, which maintains a connection with the country of origin, arose precisely as a result of migration.

The main reason for the emergence of “new” diasporas was the collapse of single multi-ethnic states - the USSR, Czechoslovakia, SFRY, and the formation in their place of independent states, when overnight, after the redistribution of borders, millions of citizens found themselves in the position of “foreigners”, without emigrating anywhere. Although the collapse of the USSR itself, the interethnic conflicts that preceded and followed it, civil wars, as well as the closely related deterioration of the internal political and socio-economic situation, certainly caused mass migrations throughout the territory of the former Union. The preference of refugees and internally displaced persons at that time was the regions bordering Kazakhstan, as well as the central and southwestern part of the country. Thus, such large cities of the North Caucasus as Stavropol, Pyatigorsk, Krasnodar, Sochi became the main refuge in some cases and a temporary transshipment base in others for migrants from Transcaucasia. And yet, a significant part of the “new migrants” from the CIS and Baltic countries is concentrated in Moscow. As of January 1, 2000, the number of non-Russian residents living in the Russian capital amounted to more than a million people. This is largely due to the fact that in the 90s. with a significant reduction in exit from Russia, and not an increase in entry, as

It is common to think that there has been an unusual increase in the migration growth of Russia at the expense of the republics of the former Union. In addition, changes in the migration flow depend on a number of other circumstances, namely:

A surge of nationalism that occurred at the end of the 80s, when the first interethnic conflicts occurred in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, which continued in the 90s. armed clashes in Tajikistan, Moldova, and Transcaucasian countries;

Transparency of Russian borders, thanks to which almost everyone could freely enter Russia;

Adoption by Russia of the Law “On Refugees”.

Another important historical fact is that during the formation of our multinational state, the Russian people were the ideological and economic “big brother” for the other peoples of the Soviet republics. And this serves as a “moral justification for the aspirations of migrants” to move to the Russian capital, where, in their opinion, they should receive housing, work and other social assistance. It is also necessary to note a noticeable increase in immigration to Russia in 1994, which is associated with Russia's faster movement along the path of market reforms. But migrants in terms of further development have always been attracted to regions that are more economically and financially developed.

It should be said that the fundamental criterion for the emergence of “world diasporas” are migration processes caused by various circumstances, while for the “new” (“post-Soviet”) diasporas the collapse of a single multi-ethnic state was the result.

It must be added that the collapse of the USSR and the formation of independent states served as a certain impetus for the emergence of such an “ethnic phenomenon as reassimilation. If earlier, say, Ukrainians for the most part had multiple identities, thanks to which one could consider oneself a citizen of the USSR, a Russian and a Ukrainian at the same time, now belonging to one or another nation comes to the fore. That is, a significant part of the non-Russian population is aware of their ethnicity, wants to preserve it, pass it on to their descendants, and tries to establish contacts with their historical homeland. And this interest in recent times is not accidental - the policy of the “melting” pot, which had been imposed on the citizens of the Soviet Union for so long, crumbled simultaneously with its collapse. However, the negative side of the collapse of a multi-ethnic state was the incredible quantitative growth of various nationalist groups, parties, etc.

Consequently, reassimilation, by reviving the non-Russian population of Russia's own national interest, contributes to the unification of people along ethnic lines.

Regarding migrations that followed the process of collapse of a single state and contributed to the formation of “new” diasporas, I would like to note that in Russia over the last 10 years they have been complicated by such significant factors as transience, as well as the unpreparedness of the Russian authorities and certain services to receive an uncontrolled flow of refugees and migrants and other “foreign migrants”. And here, a special role as an adaptive form of social organization of ethnic migrants belongs to numerous diasporas, which, with the exception of Ukrainian, Armenian, Jewish, German and a number of others, are at the initial stage of their formation. The above-mentioned “new” diasporas, having joined the “world” diasporas, received financial and organizational support from them, while the formation of diasporas in Russia, for example, in the former Central Asian republics, is much slower and more difficult. The reason for this lies in the deep differences in cultures, languages, religions, lifestyles, value systems, etc.

But in any case, regardless of nationality or religious affiliation, a person forced to leave his homeland and finding himself in a foreign environment experiences some kind of psychological stress. The loss of one’s home, job, separation from family and friends - all this aggravates a person’s already difficult psychological state. Moreover, this stress is secondary. A person experiences the first state of shock in his homeland as a result of the threat of physical violence, ethnic persecution or social pressure from nationalistically minded representatives of the “titular” nation.

The tension of mental forces, the subsequent state of uncertainty in the social consciousness of forced migrants, is also associated with the loss of one of the components of multiple identity - the identification of a person with the Soviet people. And although the ethnicity of a citizen of the USSR often became “not a matter of his personal self-determination, but was established by the state “by blood” and recorded in official documents,” now, after the emergence of sovereign states, a person increasingly “has to make significant adjustments to the personal parameters of identification.” And one of the most stable indicators of community, which has not lost its effectiveness, turned out to be precisely another element of multiple identity - identifying oneself with a particular nation. So, in the post-Soviet states, in the context of the rapid growth of ethnic self-awareness, there arose “the need to search for new forms of group identity, security and economic well-being,” which is also associated with psychological stress and anxiety.

As can be seen, the predominance of stressful causes of forced migration significantly affects the mental state of ethnic migrants. That is why one of the main functions of the diaspora in these conditions seems to be the function of adaptation. In this regard, a special place is occupied by the diaspora’s psychological assistance to its compatriots in trouble. It should be noted that timely assistance in the adaptation process plays an important role for both parties, both the arriving and the receiving party. It is important that among the migrants there may be people who had a high social, political or economic status in their homeland, and their infusion into the national diaspora will further strengthen and increase its significance. Let us note that reproduction at the expense of migrants has always been an indispensable task for any stable ethnic community. So, continuing to consider the adaptive function of the diaspora in post-Soviet times, we can distinguish everyday, psychological, socio-economic, and sociocultural adaptation. The latter is presented as the process of an individual or group entering a foreign ethnic environment, accompanied by the acquisition of skills in various fields of activity, as well as the assimilation of values, norms of this group, where the person works or studies, and their acceptance to create a line of behavior in the new environment.

The sociocultural adaptation of migrants in a new environment is more long-term and the more difficult it is, the more stable and united the diaspora is, which in turn depends on the following factors:

Degree of compact living;

The size of the diaspora;

Activities of its internal organizations and associations;

The presence of a “cementing ethnocore”.

And if the first three factors are objective, then the last subjective factor, which includes either strong ethnic self-awareness, or historical memory, or mythologization of the lost homeland, or religious faith and beliefs, or a combination of all these features, does not allow one to completely dissolve in the new sociocultural environment.

In addition to the psychological and moral support provided within the diaspora, ethnic migrants are provided with significant material assistance. And here, the fact that the diaspora belongs to the status of “global”, having the opportunity to provide financial support to their compatriots, is important.

Thus, the diaspora, being a universal form that allows simultaneous existence in a foreign environment and in the environment of one’s own ethnic group, facilitates the adaptation of arriving compatriots.

Moreover, the importance of this function increases during the period of forced rather than natural migration, when ethnic migrants exhibit one of the most powerful psychological characteristics - the desire to return to their homeland.

The adaptation function has two interrelated directions: internal and external. That is, the adaptation of ethnic migrants is carried out within the diaspora and at the same time, the diaspora is of great importance as the host of its compatriots from the outside. Therefore, we cannot fully agree with the opinion of those researchers who downplay the role of the adaptive function of diaspora, linking this with the fact that the modern diaspora is considered as a temporary refuge for a person who has only two options: either return back to his homeland or completely assimilate into a new sociocultural environment.

Along with the function of adaptation, which has both internal and external orientation, we should move on to consider the actual internal functions of the diaspora. And the main or most common internal function of ethnic diasporas can generally be called a “preserving” function, which includes the following features:

1) preserving the language of one’s people;

2) preservation of ethno-national culture (rites, traditions, ways of life, home life, dances, songs, holidays, national literature, etc.);

3) preservation of a certain religious affiliation;

4) preservation of ethnic identity (national identification, ethnic stereotypes, common historical fate).

The function of preserving material and spiritual culture is important for the diaspora. At the same time, in some cases, it is self-derived (this is especially noted in compact settlements of ethnic groups, where the traditions of the people are strong and where communication is carried out mainly in the native language), in others, the preservation of the language and other foundations of culture is carried out with the involvement of additional means, such as , the creation of national schools, the publication of special newspapers, magazines, television and radio programs, the organization of performances by various folklore groups, etc. In both cases, an important factor in the preservation of national culture is the influx of new migrants from their historical homeland. In addition, the diaspora better preserves itself in the environment of another culture thanks to objective and subjective factors, which respectively include the active work of public associations and organizations headed by authoritative leaders, internal mobilization, the tolerant attitude of the titular population, and a certain ethnopsychological core, which is understood as ethnic self-awareness.

Considering the function of preserving ethnic culture, language, and self-awareness as one of the most important functions (both old and new diasporas), one should pay attention to that part of the non-Russian population that has been living in Russia for a long time and has managed to adapt and also partially assimilate. But in connection with well-known events, their desire to revive their ethnocultural identity and establish closer contacts with their ethnic homeland has increased sharply. The activities of old national diasporas on the territory of Russia are noticeably intensifying, which is expressed in the creation of new organizations and associations, the main tasks of which are contacts in the field of culture, economics and politics of the two countries.

When analyzing the external functions of diasporas, it should be noted that they are more numerous and diverse than the internal ones. This includes interaction in the field of economics and politics between the so-called host country, mother country and the diaspora itself. At the same time, economic and political relations between them, unlike contacts in the cultural sphere, are not directly dependent on the national characteristics of certain peoples.

In the economy of our country at the beginning, and especially since the mid-90s, such a phenomenon as ethnic entrepreneurship, associated with certain types of activities of various diasporas, is gaining more and more strength. This type of entrepreneurship is especially widely developed in the border regions of Russia. Thus, the Chinese in these and other regions are primarily engaged in trading Chinese-made goods; in addition, they perform agricultural work and repair shoes. Koreans, renting land in the Far East to grow vegetables, subsequently sell salads and seasonings in various Russian cities. Trade in “southern” fruits and vegetables in the markets of large Russian cities is carried out, and often controlled, mainly by representatives of the Azerbaijani, Armenian, Georgian and other diasporas. Speaking about their employment in the trade sector, Ryazantsev S.V. notes that back in Soviet times they specialized in the delivery and trade of fruits, vegetables, flowers, and this trade acquired “colossal proportions.” Successfully using the features of their national cuisine, “southerners” open small cafes, snack bars, and restaurants. Along the highways there are various roadside cafes with Dagestan, Armenian, Georgian cuisine. That is, ethnic migrants strive to occupy free economic niches, which are not necessarily “prestigious”. Over time, having accumulated more substantial capital, ethnic entrepreneurs expand the scope of their activities or switch to another business. And here it is possible that strong ties with one’s diaspora may weaken and a desire may arise to “split off” from one’s fellow tribesmen. But the processes of individualization of people are characteristic precisely of today’s

time and cover not only life activities within diasporas, but also the entire society as a whole. Whereas the nerve of the diaspora is precisely the communal forms of being.

Consequently, when considering the functions of the national diaspora in Russia, the economic one stands out, which is most relevant at the present time.

No less significant in the last decade are the political functions performed by a number of national diasporas in Russia. Thus, the activities of some organizations are focused on supporting the goals of independence (Abkhaz diaspora), others act as opposition to the ruling regime (Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen). One of the main tasks of the German Renaissance association was to return the autonomous republic on the Volga to the Germans. G. Aliyev, at a meeting in Moscow with representatives of the Azerbaijani diaspora, focused on the fact that it is necessary not only to maintain regular contacts with one’s homeland, but also “to try to actively participate in the political and socio-economic life of the country of residence.” The President of Ukraine is also interested in the further politicization of the Ukrainian diaspora, since Russia is of strategic importance for this state. The recently formed Union of Armenians of Russia, which has spiritually and organizationally united more than two million Russian citizens, is ready, with the help of public instruments, to correct the actions of politicians if they deviate “from the logic of the objective development of Russian-Armenian relations.” At the same time, highlighting the new role of national communities - “healthy intervention in big politics.”

There is a danger that diasporas in Russia may become “overly” politicized. But this largely depends on the ambitions of their leaders, as well as on the intensification of the activities of political emigrants who, having gone abroad, did not abandon the idea of ​​​​rebuilding their abandoned homeland. As a result, the authorities need to move closer to representatives of diasporas and take into account their interests when interacting in the field of policy carried out between the country of their residence, their historical homeland and the diaspora itself. Thus, it is considered necessary to highlight the political functions inherent in the majority of diasporas in the modern world. However, their absolutization can lead to complications in relations between entire states. The President of the Union of Armenians of Russia said this very correctly: “politicians come and go, but peoples remain.”

But the most common function of the diaspora is the cultural and educational function. After all, it is in the sphere of culture, interpreted in the broadest sense of the word, that all the main distinctive features of peoples are concentrated. “And every nation has a special

nationally originated, nationally born and nationally suffered culture,” emphasizes Ilyin I.A.

Peoples who find themselves in a foreign-ethnic environment lack such objective factors as territory, political and legal institutions, as well as a stable economic structure. In these cases, a special role belongs to subjective psychological components, such as a value system, including a strong group national or ethnic identity that persists for a long time, mythologization of the lost homeland, religious beliefs, folklore features, a language with ethnic specificity, etc.

The phenomenon of the diaspora is, first of all, based on cultural identity, and its separation from its homeland strengthens the desire to preserve, and subsequently promote, its culture and language. In addition, the process of the collapse of the USSR and the appearance of several new independent states on the world map caused an increase in national self-awareness among non-Russian residents of Russia, a desire to learn more deeply about the history and culture of their people, about further relations between Russia and the homeland of their ancestors. These facts, at a certain stage of development of the diaspora, contribute to the emergence within its framework of effective organizational forms of existence, represented by various associations, organizations, societies, parties, movements, etc.

Thus, when conducting a comparative analysis of the “world” (“classical” or “old”) and “new” diasporas, it should be noted that the main reason for the former was migration caused by various circumstances. The collapse of unified multi-ethnic states (USSR, Czechoslovakia, SFRY), the socio-economic and political reform of these entities associated with the transition to a market economy, interethnic conflicts and the subsequent uncontrolled migration led to the formation of so-called “new” diasporas.

A.I. Reitblat
Diasporas and “Diasporas” (Review of “Diaspora” magazine)

In the 1990s, scientific interest in the problem of diaspora intensified. This was largely due to the growth in the number and importance of various diasporas - both those generated by labor migration, such as Turks in Germany, Arabs and blacks in France, Indians in Great Britain, and those that arose for political reasons - during the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The increase in the number of publications on this topic led to the formation, if not of a scientific discipline, then at least of a general problem field and, accordingly, the emergence of special scientific publications. In 1991, the English-language magazine “Diaspora” began to be published, and with a relatively slight delay (in 1999) the Russian one, “Diaspora”.

The then editor-in-chief of the publication (now his deputy) V.I. Dyatlov wrote in his address “To Readers,” which opened the first issue of the magazine, that “it is intended to fill the gap in a comprehensive interdisciplinary study of the process of formation of diasporas, the logic of their internal development, and the most complex problems of their relationships with the host society. It is also necessary to discuss the term and concept of “diaspora” itself. There is a need to more strictly define the subject of study itself, and, consequently, to bring existing criteria into a certain system, subject them to criticism, and perhaps formulate new ones” (p. 5). At the same time, he warned that “when compiling issues of the journal, it is proposed to proceed not through a narrow a priori delineation of the concept of “diaspora” with the corresponding selection of materials, but through a broad definition of the field of research, analysis and comparison of specific situations with subsequent conceptualization "(ibid.).

The publication is not associated with any organizational structure and is positioned in the subtitle as an “independent scientific journal.” At first it was published twice a year, since 2002 - four times, but since 2007 it returned to the original schedule. Usually there is a key topic in an issue, with which a significant part of the articles included in it is related. As a rule, such a topic becomes either the people whose diaspora is being considered: Jews (2002. No. 4; 2009. No. 2; 2011. No. 2); Armenians (2000. No. 1/2; 2004. No. 1); Tatars (2005. No. 2); Poles (2005. No. 4); Koreans and Chinese (2001. No. 2/3); “Caucasians” (2001. No. 3; 2008. No. 2); Russians (2002. No. 3; 2003. No. 4; 2010. No. 1), or a region in which certain diasporas are located (mainly in the territory of the former USSR): Moscow (2007. No. 3), South of Russia (2004. No. 4), Siberia and the Far East (2003. No. 2; 2006. No. 1), the Baltic states (2011. No. 1), Central Asia (2012. No. 1), etc. But there are also numbers compiled according to the problematic principle: language in the diaspora (2003. No. 1; 2007. No. 1/2), diaspora identity (2002. No. 2; 2009. No. 1), gender and diaspora (2005. No. 1), youth in the diaspora (2004. No. 2), diasporas in literature (2008. No. 1/2), etc.

A significant part of the articles is based on empirical material; Many authors use sociological methods in their work: surveys of the population and experts, focus groups, content analysis, etc.

From the first issue, the journal introduced the theoretical section “Dias-time as a research problem.” V.I. Dyatlov in his article “Diaspora: an attempt to define concepts” (1999. No. 1) pointed out that this term is used in a wide variety of meanings and is often interpreted extremely broadly, as a synonym for “emigration” or “national minority.” Having tried to give a more clear interpretation of this term, he paid main attention to the specific features of the diaspora situation, which presupposes both concern for preserving one’s own identity and the ability to integrate into the surrounding way of life. He emphasized that for the diaspora, “preserving one’s own identity becomes<...>an urgent, everyday task and work, a constant factor of reflection and strict intra-community regulation. All other aspects of social life were subordinated to this” (pp. 10-11). An interesting and productive position is that the inhabitants of empires, finding themselves in colonies or other states, “did not experience anxiety about preserving their identity” and “were unable to form a stable society developing on its own basis” (p. 12). For example, Russian emigrants in the twentieth century. in the first generation they considered themselves as refugees, and in the second and third generations they assimilated and “dissolved” in the surrounding society.

Like Dyatlov, other authors whose articles are included in this section do not so much analyze the key concept itself as try to define it based on the consideration of specific cases and situations. Thus, the prominent American sociologist R. Brubaker, in the article ““Diasporas of cataclysm” in Central and Eastern Europe and their relations with their homelands (using the example of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia)” (2000. No. 3) examines the aspect that researchers Diasporas either ignore or do not consider it significant - the influence of the “metropolises” on the position of “their” diasporas (protection of their rights and interests, provision of assistance, etc.). Taking the two examples indicated in the subtitle of the article, the author examines the fate of diasporas in connection with the development of various types of “post-multinational” nationalism:

1. “nationalizing” nationalism, when the titular nation is considered as the “owner” of the country, and the state as called upon to serve this nation (for example, in Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Croatia, etc.);

2. “nationalism of the homeland” - when citizens of other countries are perceived as ethnoculturally related, in relation to whom the “homeland” considers it its duty to protect their rights and interests. It is “born in direct opposition and in dynamic interaction with the nationalism of the nationalizing state” (p. 11) (Serbia, Croatia, Romania, Russia); 3) nationalism of diasporas that emerged after the collapse of multi-ethnic states. They demand that the authorities recognize them as a special national community and give them collective rights based on this. The researcher shows how dangerous the clash of the types of nationalism he identified can be.

A number of authors consider the phenomenon of diaspora on the basis of a “model” diaspora - the Jewish one (Militarev A. On the content of the term “diaspora” (Towards the development of a definition) (1999. No. 1); Chlenov M. Jewry in the system of civilizations (posing the question) (there same); Militarev A. On the problem of the uniqueness of the Jewish historical phenomenon (2000. No. 3); Popkov V. “Classical” diasporas. On the issue of the definition of the term (2002. No. 1)). In many respects, the American political scientist W. Safran follows the same path in his article “Comparative analysis of diasporas. Reflections on Robin Cohen’s book “World Diasporas” (2004. No. 4; 2005. No. 1), translated from the Canadian magazine “Diaspora”.

The political aspects of diaspora are discussed in the article by the Israeli scientist G. Sheffer “Diaspora in World Politics” (2003. No. 1), and the political contexts of the use of this word are discussed in the article by V. Tishkov “Passion for the Diaspora (about the political meanings diaspora discourse)” (2003. No. 2).

Despite all the unequal value of the works placed in the theoretical section (there were, for example, rather declarative and scholastic articles, for example “Diasporas: ethnocultural identity of national minorities (possible theoretical models)” by M. Astvatsaturova (2003. No. 2) and “Diaspora and the state of an ethnic individual” by M. Fadeicheva (2004. No. 2)), she played an important role in the journal, creating a theoretical “framework” for numerous purely empirical articles. But since 2006, this section in the magazine, unfortunately, has disappeared.

One of the key themes of the magazine is diaspora identity; the lion's share of articles are devoted to this topic, especially those related to the situation of the Russian diaspora abroad and various diasporas in Russia.

The works presented in the journal show the complexity of diaspora identity; a typical example is the article by K. Mokin “Diaspora identity in dynamics: convergence and entropy (studying the Armenians of the Saratov region)” (2006. No. 4). The author considers identity as a product of complex social interaction, the basis of which is “the process of identification, in which an individual positions himself in relation to people known to him, determines his place in society” (p. 152). Researchers have established that “the territory of origin and migration aspirations are a significant factor of demarcation within the Armenian community” (p. 159), whose members in the Saratov region distinguish five groups within the community: “Armenian Armenians” (from Armenia itself, who strongly emphasize their connection with Armenia and know the language), “Azerbaijani Armenians” (from Baku, Nagorno-Karabakh, etc.), whose identity is not so defined, they speak Russian well; “Central Asian Armenians”, who have a very vague concept of what an “Armenian” is; “Russian Armenians”, that is, Armenians who have been living in Russia for several generations; "labor migrants". It turned out that “for the diaspora, what is important is not the problem of choosing an alternative direction in the formation of identity and self-determination, but the problem of synthesizing selected cultural reference points and creating a special type of diaspora identity” (p. 163).

An interesting example of a “floating identity” is provided by the behavior of the Hemshils living in the south of Russia—Armenians who converted to Islam. Depending on the situation, they position themselves either as Armenians or as Turks (see N. Shakhnazaryan’s article “Drifting Identity: The Case of the Hemshils (Hemshins)” in No. 4, 2004).

Research has shown that in different parts of the diaspora or in the diaspora and the metropolis, the basis of the diaspora identity of persons who are usually attributed to the same nationality can be largely different factors. For example, in the USA, according to sociological research, the key factors for the formation of Jewish identity are belonging to the Jewish community, Judaism, support for the state of Israel and the Holocaust (see the article by E. Nosenko “Factors in the formation of Jewish identity among descendants mixed marriages" (2003. No. 3)). In Russia, the key factor is modern anti-Semitism; other important factors include Jewish literature and music, holidays and cuisine.

At the same time, the respondents more often defined themselves as “Russian Jews” or “Russians,” which gave researchers grounds to talk about their “dual ethnicity” (Gitelman Ts., Chervyakov V., Shapiro V. National identity of Russian Jews. (2000 . No. 3; 2001. No. 1, 2/3)).

The conditional, purely constructive nature of ethnicity is evidenced by numerous examples of “re-emigration” of representatives of a number of peoples living in the USSR to their historical homelands. Thus, in the article by I. Yasinskaya-Lahti, T.A. Mähönen and other authors “Identity and integration in the context of ethnic migration (on the example of Ingrian Finns)” (2012. No. 1) are talking about Finns who left Russia for Finland in 2008-2011. Many of them are descendants of Finns who moved to Russia several centuries ago, assimilated and forgot the Finnish language. Nevertheless, they considered themselves Finnish, seeing in themselves “Finnish” character traits, such as honesty. They hoped to successfully integrate into Finnish society without losing their culture and establishing contacts with the Finnish environment. However, in Finland they were considered Russians and were treated accordingly. As a result, there was “a (Finnish) national de-identification, as well as an actualization of Russian identification in connection with this negative experience” (p. 189).

Such rejection is no exception. Exactly the same fate, when “their own people” do not accept and call those who arrived “Russians”, and the arrival is accompanied not only by a decrease in professional status, but also cultural alienation from the new environment, social marginalization, awaited the Germans who moved from Russia in Germany, Greeks in Greece, Jews in Israel (see: Meng K., Protasova E., Enkel A. Russian component of the identity of Russian Germans in Germany (2010. No. 2); Kaurinkoski K. Perception of the homeland in the literary works of former Soviet Greeks “repatriates” (2009. No. 1); Rubinchik V. Russian-speaking immigrants in Israel in the 90s: illusions, reality, protest (2002. No. 2); Remennik L. Between the old and new homeland. . in Israel (2000. No. 3)).

It is curious that Russians who came to Russia after the collapse of the USSR faced similar problems, as written by English researchers H. Pilkington and M. Flynn (“Strangers in the Homeland? A Study of the “Diaspora Identity” of Russian Forced Migrants” (2001. No. 2/3)): “The move turned out to be not an idyllic “return home” for them, but a difficult ordeal associated with confrontation and the need to defend their rights” (p. 17). Researchers in 1994-1999 conducted surveys of Russian-speaking immigrants from other countries in a number of regions of Russia. It turned out that they do not have a clearly defined diaspora identity. Their attitude towards their former country of residence was largely determined by the imperial consciousness, the interpretation of themselves as civilizers. At the same time, along with a low assessment of the qualifications and hard work of the local population, they spoke positively about the atmosphere of interethnic communication, local culture and local traditions. In the language of the respondents there was no “Russianness”, a sense of a common language and homeland with the Russians; the researchers recorded “a strange distortion of the idea that “home is there” (" we have there"), and "they are here" in Russia (" they are here)"(p. 17). The authors come to an important conclusion that “classical models of diaspora are hardly applicable to the experience of survival of Russian-speaking imperial minorities in the newly independent states - due to the peculiarities of their settlement of the former allied periphery and their objective, but by no means subjective, “diasporization” in the post-Soviet period" (p. 28). For them, the homeland was divided into two incarnations - “home” (the place where they lived) and “homeland” (as an imaginary community).

Another conclusion that follows from the articles presented in the journal is the differences in the diaspora behavior of people who came to Russia from the countries of the former USSR and Russians who found themselves in the countries of the former USSR. The former establish social connections among themselves and create mechanisms for maintaining national identity. A good example of this is given by the Armenian community in the small town of Kolchugino in the Vladimir region, which has a common monetary fund into which all members of the community contribute money and on the basis of which there is a Sunday school, a newspaper in the Armenian language, assistance is provided to community members, experiencing financial difficulties, etc. (see: Firsov E., Krivushina V. To the study of the communication environment of the Russian Armenian diaspora (based on field research of local groups in the Vladimir region) (2004. No. 1)).

Russians who find themselves in other states after the collapse of the USSR behave differently. They, as the Norwegian researcher Paul Kolsto shows in the article “Rooting Diasporas: Russians in the Former Soviet Republics” (2001. No. 1), one way or another adapt to life there and are not very inclined (judging by the data of sociological surveys, see p. 29) consider Russia as their homeland.

N. Kosmarskaya in the article “Russian Diasporas”: Political Mythologies and Realities of Mass Consciousness” (2002. No. 2) notes that in many ways the “diasporization” of Russians outside the borders of Russia is a myth created by the media, which claim that these people perceive Russia as their homeland and strive to return to its borders. Russian-speaking communities are attributed the characteristics of “real” diasporas: “1) ethnic homogeneity; 2) a keen experience of one’s ethnicity, and precisely as a community with the mother’s people; 3) a high degree of cohesion (which also has a well-developed institutional basis - in the form of “institutions of Russian communities”), as well as controllability, trust in leaders and, finally, social homogeneity, which, in fact, makes such unanimity possible (as in the “community "); 4) orientation towards the ethnic (historical) homeland as a basic element of identity; the desire to reunite with her” (pp. 114-115).

In reality, as N. Kosmarskaya writes, based on data from sociological research in Kyrgyzstan, the situation is much more ambiguous and multivariate. Firstly, there are many people living there who are not ethnic Russians, for whom the Russian language and Russian culture are native; secondly, such Russian-speaking communities are quickly differentiated, including in relation to Russia; thirdly, the self-awareness of this group is a “complex and dynamically developing structure” in which different identities compete, and “Russianness” is only one of them; fourthly, their consolidation can occur on a different basis.

Among Russians in Kyrgyzstan, 18.0% called Russia their homeland, and 57.8% called Kyrgyzstan their homeland; in Kazakhstan, 57.7% called Kazakhstan their homeland, and 18.2% called Russia their homeland; in Ukraine, 42.5% of Russians surveyed called it their homeland, and 18.4% called Russia their homeland (p. 134).

There is another level of identity - the Central Asian community, that is, local identity (for example, solidarity with the peoples of this region). Russians in Kyrgyzstan perceive themselves as somewhat different from Russians in Russia.

I. Savin in the article “Russian identity as a social resource in modern Kazakhstan (based on materials from a study of representatives of the Russian elite)” (2003. No. 4) writes that Russians in Kazakhstan “do not have kinship or neighboring structures of mutual assistance, held together by symbolic attributes.” ributs of a generally shared ethnicity” (p. 101), “in every Russian, another Russian does not automatically see a potential social partner” (p. 92). At the same time, the majority do not know the Kazakh language, i.e. is not going to assimilate. Thus, according to the researcher, language (and the state’s attitude towards language) is the basis of the identity of Russians in Kazakhstan. A similar picture of the inability to unite and achieve common goals among the Russians of Uzbekistan is painted by E. Abdullaev (“Russians in Uzbekistan in the 2000s: identity in conditions of demodernization” (2006. No. 2)).

In the Baltics, Russians are undergoing quite intense processes of assimilation and identification with the “indigenous population.” Thus, E. Brazauskienė and A. Likhacheva, in the article “Russians in modern Lithuania: language practices and self-identification” (2011. No. 1), based on a study conducted in 2007-2009, come to the conclusion that the Russians of Lithuania “feel themselves are different from the Russians of Russia and believe that in Russia they are not considered one of their own. 20% of Russians in Lithuania do not mind if they are considered Lithuanians, 46% stated during the survey that they do not care whether they are called Russians or Lithuanians, 10% abstained from a definite answer and only about 14% do not agree so that they are considered Lithuanians” (p. 71). At the same time, the Russians of Lithuania also note their differences from the Lithuanians. The basis of such self-identification is the Russian language.

An interesting situation was considered by M. Ryabchuk in the article “Who is the largest fish in the Ukrainian pond? A new look at relations between the minority and the majority in the post-Soviet state" (2002. No. 2). Unlike other states of the post-Soviet space, in Ukraine there were two numerous people indigenous to this territory. The author characterizes the socio-cultural and political confrontation between two parts of the population - with Ukrainian identity and with Russian identity, between which there is a fairly large group of “Russified Ukrainians, distinguished by a mixed, blurred identity” (p. 26) and defining themselves through the region residence (“residents of Odessa”, “residents of Donbass”, etc.). The first seek to create a national Ukrainian state with one state language - Ukrainian, the second do not want to lose the position of cultural dominance that belonged to them in the past, and in many ways even now, and the intermediate group does not, in the author’s opinion, have a clear position, and for Both extreme groups are fighting it. The government does not pursue any consistent policy in this aspect, which creates a very unstable situation.

The author does not believe that the existing status quo can be maintained for long. He sees two possible scenarios for the development of events: either the marginalization of Ukrainians (i.e. Ukraine will become a “second Belarus”), or the marginalization of Russians. He considers the second option preferable, since “convinced Ukrainians, who managed to protect their linguistic identity even under powerful pressure from the Russian and Soviet empires, will never accept the marginal status of a minority in their country, in independent Ukraine” (p. 27). According to sociological surveys cited by M. Ryabchuk, only 10% of Russians in Ukraine consider Russia their homeland, almost a third of this group does not object to the fact that their children (grandchildren) will study at school in the Ukrainian language (p. 21), for ten post-Soviet years, almost half of the Russians in Ukraine began to identify themselves with Ukrainians (p. 22).

The presented data on the situation of Russians who found themselves outside of Russia after the collapse of the USSR, when a variety of options for diaspora identity arise, clearly demonstrate the complexity of both the scientific study of the problem of the diaspora and the practical activities of Russia in providing them with assistance and support.

Assessing the work done by the editors of the journal (and by domestic “diaspora studies”?), it should be noted that in the course of a number of studies, various empirical data were collected on the situation of residence of some peoples (mainly the former USSR) among others, on their self-awareness and identification. However, the “follow-up conceptualization” promised in the first issue of the journal has not yet been implemented. In our opinion. This is due to the fact that, while willingly using sociological methods of collecting information, researchers do not practice a sociological vision of the material. This is expressed in the fact that when studying the identity of diasporas, they usually ignore the social institutions “responsible” for the creation and maintenance of diaspora identity. Thus, the journal very rarely contains works in which the role of school, church, literature, cinema, mass media, especially the Internet, in this process is explored.

It is curious that the social reasons for the emergence of organizations that pretend to express the interests of diasporas that really do not exist or exist outside of connection with them (a kind of “pseudo-diasporas”), and their further functioning were subjected to a detailed study in the journal in an article by S. Rumyantsev and R. Baramidze “Azerbaijanis and Georgians in Leningrad and St. Petersburg: how “diasporas” are constructed” (2008. No. 2; 2009. No. 1). The authors demonstrated that “the Azerbaijani and Georgian “diasporas” are (re)produced through the institutionalization of bureaucratic structures and discursive practices, in the space of which ethnic activists (intellectuals and businessmen) and “statistical” Azerbaijanis and Georgians unite into numerous cohesive communities, are endowed with common goals and build, as collective political authors, relationships with the political regimes of the countries of destination and origin” (2009. No. 1. P. 35).

But few people are involved in the social mechanisms by which the real diaspora is formed (that is, the church, parties, cultural organizations, the press, television and radio, the Internet, etc.). Often the media and literature are considered in their “reflective” role - a “mirror” (albeit often a very crooked one) of diasporas, for example in the block of articles “The Life of Diasporas in the Mirror of the Media” (2006. No. 4), as well as in the works of M. Krutikov “The experience of Russian Jewish emigration and its reflection in the prose of the 90s.” (2000. No. 3), S. Prozhogina “Literature of French-speaking Maghrebians about the drama of the North African diaspora” (2005. No. 4); D. Timoshkina “The image of the “Caucasian” in the pantheon of villains of the modern Russian crime novel (using the example of the works of Vladimir Kolychev)” (2013. No. 1). But their creative role, participation in the creation and preservation of diasporas is almost not studied. Thus, only four works are devoted to the role of the Internet for diasporas. In the article by M. Schorer-Zeltzer and N. Elias “My address is neither a house nor a street.”: Russian-speaking diaspora on the Internet” (2008. No. 2), based on the analysis of Russian-language emigrant sites, the thesis about the transnationality of the Russian-speaking diaspora, and in the article by N. Elias “The role of the media in the cultural and social adaptation of repatriates from the CIS in Israel”, based on interviews with emigrants from the CIS, it is concluded that “Russian-language media, on the one hand, strengthen the cultural framework of the Russian-speaking community , on the other hand, they contribute to the integration of immigrants based on the formation of a new self-awareness, including current social issues” (p. 103).

Two works by O. Morgunova are of much greater interest. The first is the article ““Europeans live in Europe!”: Searches for identity in the Internet community of Russian-speaking immigrants in the UK” (2010. No. 1), which analyzes the Internet discourse of Russian-speaking migrants in the UK. Based on materials from the web forums “Bratok” and “Rupoint”, the author shows how the idea of ​​“Europeanness” is formed there, which is then used to formulate one’s own identity. “Europeanness” acts as a synonym for “culture” and “civilization” (this interpretation has been widespread in Europe itself over the last three centuries), and “culture” is mainly limited to the 18th-19th centuries, modern art and literature are not included in it , this is “a culture created in the past and practically unchanged” (p. 135). The author comes to the conclusion that the system of group solidarity of migrants includes two types of positive Other (external - the British and internal - migrant from Ukraine) and two of the same types of negative Other (external - “non-European” migrants and internal - “scoop”), and this typology is based on the idea of ​​“Europeanness”.

The second article, “The Internet community of post-Soviet Muslim women in Britain: religious practices and searches for identity” (2013. No. 1), deals not so much with national, but with religious identity in the diaspora. Based on interviews and analysis of relevant websites, the author comes to the conclusion that, for various reasons, Muslim women who came from the territory of the former USSR “transfer religious practices to the Internet, where they follow Islam among friends and relatives, remaining unnoticed by British society” ( p. 213). It is the Internet that becomes the sphere of construction and manifestation of their religiosity.

In our opinion, the underestimation of the media observed in the magazine when choosing topics is unjustified, since they have radically changed the very nature of modern diasporas. Everyone who writes about the diaspora agrees that it is made up of representatives of some people living outside their native country, aware of their connection with it and striving to preserve their cultural (religious) specificity. At the same time, historians know that, finding themselves in such a situation, some peoples create a diaspora community, while others assimilate after one or two generations. It is clear that the prerequisite for creating a diaspora is a “strong” cultural “baggage” (belonging to an ancient and rich culture, faith in the mission of one’s people, etc.), but in order to realize this prerequisite, special social institutions are needed, ensuring both the maintenance of purely social ties (institutions of mutual assistance, charity, etc.) and the preservation and transmission of national culture (church, school, publishing books and periodicals, etc.).

In the traditional diaspora, the cultural isolation that arises due to the territorial distance from the homeland is compensated by the careful preservation (to a certain extent, conservation) of the cultural baggage taken from the homeland. If markers of national identity are not so important for the metropolis, then the diaspora, due to its existence in a foreign cultural context, needs clear boundaries, therefore it is culturally more conservative compared to the metropolis. Here, loyalty to the past and key symbols is always emphasized, and much more attention is paid to maintaining tradition than innovation.

The process of globalization is changing the nature of diasporas in many ways. Firstly, transport is developing, and airplanes, high-speed trains, cars, etc. provide rapid travel, including the possibility of frequent trips to their homeland for immigrants. Secondly, television and the Internet have created the opportunity for synchronous, “online” communication, for everyday communication (including business, political, artistic) participation in the life of the homeland.

The nature of “national” identity is also changing. If earlier it was “two-layered” (“small homeland” and country), now hybrid formations are emerging (for example, “German Turks”, who have a triple identity - “Turks”, “Germans” and “German Turks” ), not to mention trans-national identity (“resident of Europe”).

Now the diaspora is no longer so isolated from the metropolis as it was before. You can always return home, you can work (live) abroad part of the time, etc.

But, on the other hand, with the development of the media and the Internet, maintaining social and cultural connections becomes easier, which creates the preconditions for the easier formation and maintenance of diaspora identity (especially for peoples who are expelled from their native places).

All these processes call into question the traditional interpretation of the diaspora phenomenon, so researchers will have to look for new terms and new theoretical models for it.

Ethnic diasporas.

Ethnic diasporas- these are stable communities of people of a single ethnic origin (one or related nationalities), living in a foreign ethnic environment outside their historical homeland (or outside the area of ​​settlement of their people) and having social organizations for the development and functioning of this historical community.

It is especially worth emphasizing such a feature of the diaspora as its immanent ability to self-organize, which allows the diaspora to exist for a long time, remaining a relatively self-sufficient organism.

In the course of historical development, the number of such diasporas has constantly increased after aggressive campaigns, wars, under conditions of ethnic and religious persecution, oppression and restrictions. New and Contemporary times have written their page in the history of diasporas; they began to appear as a result of the development of new territories, economic transformations that required significant labor resources (USA, Canada, Siberia, South Africa, Australia). The reason for the formation of diasporas outside their historical homeland for a number of nations was also agrarian resettlement, the need for other areas of employment, oppression and restrictions in public life, which could be interpreted as ethnic persecution...

The modern period of civilization has made certain adjustments to the process of development and functioning of diasporas. In each country this process has common features and some features in comparison with similar phenomena.

Let's look at the example of Russia:

1. there is a process of growth, consolidation and organizational strengthening of old diasporas: Armenian (550 thousand), Jewish (530 thousand), Tatar (3.7 million), Greek (91.7 thousand), etc. These organizations of various directions protect and promote culture and language , the religion of their people, and also promote the development of economic ties and perform others, incl. social functions.

2. diasporas of peoples appeared and took organizational shape, which arose solely for the reason that independent states were formed, such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, etc. In the changed conditions, the value of national culture, the significance of national identity encourages them to various forms of consolidation both in the sphere socio-economic, as well as political and spiritual relations

3. a number of diasporas on Russian territory appeared as a result of turmoil, civil wars, and interethnic tension. It was these conflicts that gave rise to the Georgian (30 thousand), Azerbaijani (200-300 thousand), Tajik (10 thousand) and other diasporas of the peoples of the former union republics. These diasporas are a miniature reflection of the contradictions that are characteristic of these republics, therefore their activities are ambiguous.

4. Diasporas representing the actual peoples of Russia appeared. This is typical for Moscow and a number of other large cities or regions of the country and applies to such republics as Dagestan, Chechnya, Chuvashia, Buryatia and some others.

5. It should be noted that there is a special group of diasporas that exist in a semi-formed, embryonic state, which reflect the political processes of the past and present. This applies to the Korean diaspora (whose population was evicted from the Far East), the Afghan diaspora (due to emigrated adults or children raised in the USSR and Russia), the Bulgarian diaspora (after the severance of Soviet-Bulgarian ties), the Meskhetian diaspora (which, after the forced eviction this people from Georgia lived in Uzbekistan for almost 40 years, and, having survived the Fergana tragedy of 1989, its representatives still cannot return to their historical homeland)

Analyzing the phenomenon of diaspora, it is important to note that the scientific literature still there is no clarity in the use of this term. It is often combined with the concept "ethnic community", "ethnic group" and others, however, the latter concepts are clearly broader in scope.

An analysis of the history of the emergence and development of diasporas allows us to conclude that its first and main feature is the presence of an ethnic community of people outside the country (territory) of their origin in a foreign ethnic environment. It is this separation from its historical homeland that forms that initial distinctive feature, without which it is useless to talk about the essence of this phenomenon.

Diaspora is an ethnic community that has the basic or important characteristics of the national identity of its people, preserves them, supports them and promotes their development: language, culture, consciousness.

Diaspora has some organizational forms of its functioning, starting with fraternity and ending with the presence of social and sometimes political movements.

Another distinctive feature of the diaspora: its implementation social protection of its members: assistance in employment, professional self-determination, ensuring their rights within the framework of the constitution and legislation in general, etc.

Plays an important role in the formation and existence of diasporas religious factor. Religion in a number of cases becomes a cementing factor in the consolidation of coreligionists (often coinciding with a particular nationality).

Diasporas carry out a wide variety of activities functions: economic, social, cultural, and sometimes political.

The scope of functions performed, various life circumstances, the presence of statehood and other factors determine one or another typology of diasporas. SM: A book...

No less important is the question of life cycle of the diaspora or the duration of its existence. The analysis shows that the time interval for the functioning of diasporas depends on demographic, territorial, socio-economic, political, ethnocultural and other factors. Diaspora is rather fragile organism, especially at the stage of its formation, which may cease to exist at any stage.

CONCLUSION

Scope of national policy- This is to a large extent an area of ​​coordination of ethnic interests, where it is possible to build an optimal structure of interaction.

However, until now, official national policy has weakly or not at all operated with this concept, and does not consider diasporas as a real and effective tool for the rational interaction of people of different nationalities both within the entire state and its individual territories.

______________________________

Russian civilization: Study. manual for universities / Under general. ed. M.P. Mchedlova. – M., 2003. – p.631 – 639.

1.3 Functions of the diaspora

The fate of each diaspora is unique and original to the same extent as the life of each person is unusual and individual. At the same time, their activities have many common functions. They are inherent in both “old” and “new” diasporas, both localized and dispersed, both small and numerous national communities. Despite the different reasons for their appearance and formation, they are still characterized by some common features. However, it should be noted that the volume, richness and completeness of these functions can seriously distinguish one diaspora from another.

The most common function of the diaspora is their active participation in maintaining, developing and strengthening the spiritual culture of their people, in cultivating national traditions and customs, and in maintaining cultural ties about their historical homeland.

In this regard, the preservation of the native language occupies a special place. It is well known that language is fully realized in a compact living environment, but in dispersed living conditions it can lose its communicative role. And as a rule, the full functioning of a language depends on its status in a particular state. The emerging diaspora usually uses their native language in informal communication and very rarely in teaching at school, in office work, in the media, etc. It is precisely to achieve this that she has to fight. The native language is a relay of national culture, and its loss has a direct impact on some of its components, primarily in the spiritual sphere (customs, traditions, self-awareness). Nevertheless, in reality we can observe a situation where many parts that have broken away from their ethnic group, having lost partially or completely their native language, continue to function as a diaspora (for example, German, Korean, Assyrian, Chuvash, etc.).

Consequently, the preservation of the native language is sometimes not a defining feature of the diaspora. However, its gradual loss indicates the development of assimilation processes. This situation may be aggravated by the closeness of the cultural distance between ethnic groups - titular and diasporic. And if there are no other features that unite the ethnic community, or they are also lost, its collapse as a result of assimilation is close.

No less important for the functioning of the diaspora is the preservation by its representatives of their ethnic culture, by which we understand the components of material, spiritual and socio-normative activities that differ to one degree or another from a foreign and supra-ethnic culture. Ethnic culture is most clearly manifested in literature, art, ethnic symbols, traditions, some forms of material culture (especially in food, clothing), and folklore.

The preservation of ethnic culture is certainly a sign of the diaspora. However, after a certain period of time, the ethnic culture of the diaspora is no longer identical to the culture of the ethnic group from which the ethnic community broke away. The culture of a foreign ethnic environment leaves its mark on it, and as a result of a possible loss of connection with the maternal ethnic group, the continuity of cultural traditions is lost. The situation is aggravated by the difficulty of preserving ethnic culture in an urban environment, where standardized standards of material and spiritual culture are common.

The preservation of ethnic culture largely depends on the cultural distance between the diaspora and the foreign ethnic environment, the tolerance of the state and, finally, the desire of the group itself to preserve its culture.

The key, in our opinion, is the preservation of ethnic self-awareness or a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group, externally manifested in the form of a self-name or ethnonym. Its internal content consists of the opposition “us - them”, the idea of ​​a common origin and historical destinies, connection with the “native land” and “native language”. According to O.I. Shkaratana, a change in ethnic identity is an indicator of the completion of the assimilation of the national diaspora.

The most important function of diasporas in modern Russia is the protection of the social rights of representatives of a given people. As mentioned above, this is related to the regulation of migration flows, employment, assistance in professional self-determination, participation in the life of one’s republic or host country.

Social functions also affect the problems of citizenship, the preservation of what was positive in the USSR when peoples lived together. This should also include the efforts of diasporas to overcome various manifestations of chauvinism, anti-Semitism, the so-called ideology of “persons of Caucasian nationality”, etc., because here are the roots of mutual mistrust, alienation and even hostility.

The economic function that some diasporas seek to realize is becoming increasingly important. We are talking about the development of such forms of economic activity in which specific types of production of folk crafts and consumer goods are realized. This enriches the lives not only of representatives of this diaspora, but also the lives of people of other nationalities. Attempts made, for example, by the Tatar diaspora to organize the production of consumer goods, special food products, and drinks in Moscow, the Moscow region, and a number of regions of Russia contributed to a more fulfilling life for both the Tatars themselves and all other nationalities, primarily Russians. The Ukrainian diaspora in Moscow is also taking a number of measures to revive the crafts of the Ukrainian people.

The implementation of such an economic function as the right to trade is somewhat unique, although it gives rise to many doubts, frictions and even aggravations (for example, in relation to the Azerbaijani diaspora). However, it is necessary to proceed from historical experience, when almost many types of trade are transferred into the hands of representatives of eastern nations. The experience of Europe once again demonstrates that from such a tendency, for example, among the Turks, Europe only benefited, although for this it formulated a number of conditions that ultimately turned out to be beneficial for both sides.

In addition, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that a number of diasporas also perform political functions. This is manifested, firstly, in the fact that they lobby for the possibility of obtaining additional rights and opportunities for their republics (their people), receiving special guarantees for their effective development, and expanding their powers both within Russia and in the international arena.

Secondly, diasporas, or rather, a number of their organizations (Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen) act as opposition to the ruling regime, organizing all possible forces - from publishing newspapers to organizing public opinion - to fight political forces that are unacceptable to them.

Thirdly, diasporas directly influence the international positions of the country of residence.

The life of the Bulgarian diaspora, formed in the oil fields of the Tyumen North and in the timber industry enterprises of the Komi Republic, has also acquired an international aspect, since their further stay affects the processes of economic and political interaction between Russia and Bulgaria.

Chapter 2 Russian diaspora in the Baltic countries

Ethnologists divide the ethnic structures of multiethnic states into two systems: centralized and dispersed. In the first case, some of the ethnic groups are so large that their relationships are constantly at the center of socio-political life. In the second, the population consists of a small number of ethnic groups, each of which is too weak or small in number to dominate the Center.

The relationship between the titular nation and ethnic Russians is close to the first system. Moreover, the severity of the problem is not always identical to quantitative indicators. Conventionally, post-Soviet republics can be divided into three groups:

1. republics where Russians make up 20% and higher (Kazakhstan - 37.8%, Latvia - 34%, Estonia - 30.3%, Ukraine -22.1%, Kyrgyzstan - 21.5%);

2. republics where Russians account for 10 to 20% of the population (Belarus - 13.2%, Moldova - 13%);

3. republics where Russians account for less than 10% (Lithuania - 9.4%, Uzbekistan - 8.3%, Tajikistan - 7.6%, Turkmenistan - 7.6%, Azerbaijan -5.6%, Georgia - 6 .3%, Armenia - 1.6%).

However, the comparative small number of Russians in Moldova and Tajikistan does not mean that their relationships with the titular nation are less significant for the socio-political life of the republics than, for example, in Kazakhstan or the Baltic countries. In Armenia, where Russians are especially small in number, among the reasons that prompted them to leave the republic was the unresolved language issue. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, the situation that arose in connection with the adoption of the Law on Language and the introduction of a language inspection deprived the Russian population of the opportunity to study in secondary and higher educational institutions and led to the unemployment of many highly qualified workers. If in the 1987/88 academic year there were 82 purely Russian schools and 29 mixed ones in the republic, then in 1993/94 there were only 4 of them left.

Unlike traditional diasporas, the Russian diaspora in the new foreign countries consists of indigenous residents of a previously unified state, in relation to whom the term “migrant” is in principle inapplicable. A quantitative analysis of the structure of the Russian population in the republics of the new foreign countries shows that by 1989 at least a third (from 32.5 to 65.1%) of Russians were natives of these republics. Thus, in Estonia in 1989, only 34.9% of the Russian population were immigrants (65.1% were born in Estonia); 43.3% of the Russian population of Moldova, 42.3% of Ukraine, 41.6% of Latvia were born in these republics. Thus, attempts to identify Russians with the concept of “migrants” can hardly be considered justified. The reasons for the migration of Russians from Russia, according to the latest census, are in most cases due to family motives, and not at all the “imperial policy of the Center.” Thus, 88% of those who moved in 1986-87. Russians in Tallinn and 44% of those who came to Chisinau named family circumstances as the main reason for moving. In second place in terms of motivation for migration processes from Russia to other republics of the former USSR were: continuation of studies, placement after graduation from a higher educational institution, invitation as specialists. The Russians who arrived made a great contribution to the development of industry, science, culture and education in the republics of the former USSR. According to census data, by the turn of the 80-90s, in all republics except Lithuania, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, Russians made up a quarter or more of workers employed in industrial production. The main work in agriculture in all republics was performed by workers of indigenous nationalities. The Russian population was replenished mainly due to highly qualified personnel.

The term “national minority” is also of little use to Russians living in the republics of the former USSR, because in most countries of the new abroad, Russians are the state-forming nation, making up more than a third of the population in Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia; more than 20% - in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan; 13% - in Belarus and Moldova.

The course towards building a monoethnic, monolinguistic society, undertaken by the leadership of most countries of the new abroad, met with a negative reaction not only from the Russians, but also from the Russian-speaking population of these states. Thus, the language situation in the republics was as follows. The Russian population of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Armenia should be recognized as the most familiar with the language of the indigenous nationality, where from 27 to 34% of Russians spoke it fluently as a second language or considered it their native language. At the same time, 19.7% of Belarusians and 12.2% of Ukrainians named Russian as their native language. In Minsk, according to experts, the processes of loss of the Belarusian language as the native language of the Belarusian population have become widespread and, possibly, irreversible. The majority of Moldovans (95.7%), Latvians (97.4%), Estonians (99%), and Lithuanians (99.7%) named the language of their nationality as their mother tongue in 1989. Representatives of other ethnic groups living in the republics named Russian not only as the main language of communication, but also as their native language. Thus, by the beginning of the 90s, real multilingualism had developed in the republics of the USSR, in which both ethnic Russians and representatives of other nationalities were native speakers of the Russian language. Polylingualism was complemented by a large number of interethnic marriages. The lowest rates of endogamy among the Russian population were characteristic of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Lithuania. The Russian population in Latvia was more endogamous (28.9%) and these figures were even higher in Estonia. Thus, by 1989, the republics of the USSR were multiethnic, multilinguistic entities. The collapse of the USSR led to a gigantic fracture of a single ethnic, cultural and linguistic space. A specific feature of the Russian diaspora in the new diaspora is the blurring of its ethnic contours. It is no coincidence that it is the linguistic factor and the commonality of culture that become decisive in the formation of the modern Russian diaspora, and not nationality.

Unlike traditional diasporas in far-abroad countries, ethnic Russians in the new foreign countries experience serious difficulties in exercising civil rights and do not have the opportunity to influence decision-making regarding the situation of the Russian diaspora. In most countries of the new abroad, the rights of representatives of non-titular nationalities (the majority of whom are Russian and Russian-speaking) are significantly limited: to work, to receive education in their native language, to social security. The possibility of exercising the right to protection from propaganda that has a detrimental effect on the preservation and development of Russian culture, language, education, and from manifestations of everyday nationalism is significantly limited.

The problems of political rights and socio-economic security of Russians are interconnected. The latter cannot be considered as something of secondary importance, since social security not only depends on the general situation in the republic, but also has an ethnic connotation. There is a well-known thesis from official circles in Estonia and Latvia that Russians in the Baltic countries are concerned primarily with their economic situation and do not feel disadvantaged due to restrictions on civil rights.

However, already in 1992 in Estonia, 40% of working Russians suffered from social competition due to their ethnicity; 82.5% of Russians felt infringement of national dignity in the domestic sphere, 20% - in business. 64% of Estonians spoke out against working in interethnic teams.

The block of social problems includes restrictions on the right to social security, the right to protection of honor and dignity of the individual. The need for Russian labor exists in all former Soviet republics.

The introduction of certification for knowledge of the state language complicated interethnic relations in many republics, depriving Russians of prospects for professional growth and the opportunity to continue working in their specialty.

The social and economic insecurity of Russians, due to the general economic situation of the “initial period of capital accumulation,” is aggravated by the ethnic factor.

Indeed, the bulk of Russians, as well as non-Russian citizens of the republics of the former USSR, are concerned about their economic situation. It can be assumed that if the standard of living of Russians in the republic is higher than in Russia, then migration sentiments will manifest themselves weaker, even with restrictions on political rights. But the prospect for Russians as an ethnic group will be assimilation, the loss of national identity. In addition, practice shows that in republics with a relatively high standard of living they hinder the social advancement of Russians, leaving them with work associated with unskilled, manual labor (the Baltic republics).

The course towards building a mono-ethnic society, chosen by the leaders of the former Soviet republics, has recently undergone serious changes. Nevertheless, the problem of preserving and developing Russian national heritage - culture, education, language - is one of the most acute.

It is no coincidence that a number of researchers, naming possible guidelines for Russian foreign policy, highlight as goals the introduction of state bilingualism in all post-Soviet states, active assistance in the creation and strengthening of Russian communities, and the allocation of funds to support Russian culture and education.

It can be debated whether “Soviet culture” existed in reality, but the fact that during the years of Soviet power certain cultural values ​​were formed that cannot be identified with any one national culture can hardly raise doubts.

The post-Soviet Baltic states or post-Soviet Central Asia are precisely post-Soviet states, and not some “revived” entities. In conditions of interaction of cultures, it is possible to create a stable, prosperous society only on the basis of a unifying goal and spiritual values ​​common to all nationalities. Currently, in the post-Soviet space, it is primarily the elites of new political entities that are “self-determining” and “mutually determining”. The new political elites of the former Soviet republics have so far been unable to either create or implement an optimal model of interethnic relations. Although achieving interethnic consensus is one of the important conditions for the new elites to maintain political power. That is why the question of how truly homogeneous new national cultures are and how capable they are of building their identities not on the principle of exclusivity, but on unifying principles and on the loyalty of citizens to the state in which they live is extremely important.

The position of Russians in a number of new foreign countries remains a factor that seriously complicates the development of Russia’s relations with these states. An analysis of the policy pursued by the leadership of the Baltic countries, primarily Estonia and Latvia, shows that it is based on a course towards the creation of ethnocratic, mononational states. There is no tendency to improve the situation of non-titular peoples in the sphere of observance of their civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights. The most pressing issue in Latvia and Estonia remains the issue of acquiring citizenship. It should be noted that representatives of the Council of Europe, OSCE and other international organizations actually apply the practice of double standards in assessing events taking place in the Baltic countries. For public opinion in the West, this anti-Russian course is presented as liquidation of the consequences of the occupation of the Baltics by the USSR in 1940. The construction of ethnocratic states is being carried out in the CIS member countries. The sharp narrowing of the Russian cultural, linguistic, educational, information space is aggravated by the intensification of the activities of nationalist organizations in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and in zones of interethnic conflicts, which raises the question of the very possibility of preserving ethnic identity by Russians in the countries of the new abroad.

Unlike the world's diasporas, which have a long historical experience of organizational functioning, have financial potential, and influence in the political and business circles of various countries around the world, the Russian diaspora of the new abroad is in its infancy. The current state of the Russian social and socio-political movement in the CIS and the Baltic states is characterized by a continuing split, rivalry between various large and small structures, and the absence of leaders capable of uniting the most active part of the diaspora on the scale of the republic or at least a large region. An analysis of the development of the situation in the Russian movement of the new abroad allows us to say with a reasonable degree of confidence that the timing of their painful growth will be largely determined by the degree of activity in this issue of the relevant Russian departments, which will have to abandon the focus on achieving quick results and aim for the long term.

PhD in Political Science

One of the features of the outgoing year is the increasing role of diasporas in international cooperation. States that have significant human potential beyond their borders are increasingly considering foreign diasporas as an important foreign policy and economic resource. This is discussed in the expert commentary of Ksenia Borishpolets, professor of the Department of World Political Processes.

Diasporas are a common element of political life in almost all regions of the world. Their numbers, diversity and activity increased significantly at the beginning of the 21st century. This made it possible to talk about the “diasporization of the world” as one of the scenarios for the development of humanity. Diasporas can be monoethnic or multinational, when their origin is based on the factor of a common country of origin (Russian-speaking diasporas in the United States and Germany).

Modern diasporas differ significantly from each other in numbers, organization and social activity. The largest diasporas formally include the Chinese diaspora (35 million people), the Indian diaspora (25 million), the Russian diaspora (25 million), the Ukrainian diaspora (12 million), the Armenian diaspora (about 10 million people); the Jewish diaspora ( 8 million), etc. In addition, a number of experts point to the existence of the Kurdish diaspora (14 million), Irish (10 million), Italian (8 million) and others. All data on diasporas are estimates and are not supported by reliable statistics. .

The growth of diasporas continues and takes on new forms. As they establish themselves in the new social environment, representatives of diasporas successfully expand the geographical scope of their presence in the host country, often diversify their economic activities, and master the rules of advancement in the local social hierarchy. It is characteristic that diasporas usually strive to reproduce in their environment the mechanisms of public administration, similar to state structures, they form three functional categories of elite - administrative, spiritual (cultural-religious) and power (albeit informal), and manage significant financial resources. However, as in the case of conventional government entities, diaspora leaders do not necessarily rely on the massive support of ordinary members and are not always successful in developing cooperation with the official structures of the host country or country of origin.

Each national diaspora, regardless of its size, is a unique entity. Its political behavior is determined by a set of private subjective characteristics and can change noticeably, which complicates the interaction of diasporas and the state.

The localization of national diasporas is so diverse that today they form transnational networks and occupy a special place in the system of international relations. The “cross” presence of the diaspora component in two or more countries is becoming increasingly common. Using the opportunities of the foreign diaspora to develop economic, socio-political and other ties is a fairly common phenomenon. But the initiative does not always belong to the state or its structures. Often the diaspora itself creates a system of network relations, and the historical homeland becomes one of the links in the international chain on which community leaders who permanently reside outside the country of origin rely.

If we abstract from the specific factors of mutual deterrence that arise in a situation with the “cross” presence of diasporas, then the diaspora policy of states is complicated by the discrepancy between the political preferences of representatives of diasporas and the bulk of the population of the country of origin, which is accompanied by the activity of opposition leaders, agitators, provocateurs, etc. ; massive criminalization of diasporas, especially young people, and the growing influence of large criminal groups; lack of funds and personnel to establish targeted work with the diaspora(s).

These challenges are universal, relating both to state policy in relation to “our own” and “foreign” diasporas.

Examples of states that actively and effectively interact with “their” diasporas are Israel, France, Poland, Hungary, Greece, China, Ireland, and India. The United States works most successfully with “foreign” diasporas. However, firstly, all achievements are the result of long historical development; secondly, they include not only positive experiences, but also cases of unsuccessful endeavors; thirdly, only part of the actual practice becomes public domain. In this regard, specialized work with diasporas everywhere faces such a serious obstacle as bureaucratization, when behind the façade of “folklore” events there is stagnation of major government initiatives.

In general, a pragmatic approach is increasingly gaining ground in relations between states and national diasporas. A politically significant innovation in this area was the transformation of traditional priorities. It includes a departure from the course of repatriation policy as the main task of interaction with foreign compatriots, expanding the targeted use of the diaspora’s potential in establishing connections with foreign partners, and limiting “paternalistic demonstrations” and similar populist steps in dialogue with diaspora associations abroad.

Modernization of government work with national diasporas is usually accompanied by institutional innovations, which are especially clearly realized in the example of diasporas in the United States. In this regard, the experience of two Russian BRICS partners - China and India - is noteworthy.

The Israeli experience of modernizing relations with diasporas is interesting. At the state level, there is constant lobbying for the idea of ​​creating a Diaspora Parliament and giving members of foreign Jewish communities the right to make decisions that are important for the country. However, a more moderate and pragmatic version of the Israeli strategy to stimulate ties with the Diaspora boils down to the formula “Relations must be two-way.” If previously the Jewish diaspora donated money to Israel en masse, now it is expected to begin investing Israeli capital in the diaspora. It is believed that against the backdrop of the identity crisis experienced by Jews who are increasingly integrating into the societies of their countries of residence, Israel no longer needs the money of the Diaspora. On the contrary, he is able to create Jewish cultural and educational centers abroad, similar to the British Council.

The development of state cooperation with national diasporas is invariably hampered by one political consideration: how to ensure that the mechanisms of interaction with diasporas do not turn into a mechanism of foreign influence on the country. It is not always possible to compensate for the “distortions” that arise.

Russian departments and public organizations face many tasks in developing cooperation with compatriots living abroad. In my opinion, the main one is the expansion of support for defending the democratic rights of the Russian-speaking population in the countries of the post-Soviet space.