The Battle of Kursk (Battle of Kursk), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces and thereby create favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive, and then a general strategic offensive .

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the sector, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy group, according to Soviet sources, numbered about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts) with more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, German attack groups, according to the Operation Citadel plan, launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. From Orel, a group under the command of Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, and from Belgorod, a group under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Operational Group Kempf, Army Group South).

The task of repelling the attack from Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, and from Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of World War II took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day; by evening, tank crews and infantry were fighting hand-to-hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wings of the Western Front began Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of defeating the enemy’s Oryol group. On July 13, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front had completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front were brought into the battle and began pursuing the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. Soviet losses exceeded German losses; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6 thousand tanks.

Battle of Kursk

July 5 – August 23, 1943
By the spring of 1943, there was a lull on the battlefields. Both warring sides were preparing for the summer campaign. Germany, having carried out total mobilization, concentrated more than 230 divisions on the Soviet-German front by the summer of 1943. The Wehrmacht received many new T-VI Tiger heavy tanks, T-V Panther medium tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, new Focke-Wulf 190 aircraft and other types of military equipment.

The German command decided to regain the strategic initiative lost after the defeat at Stalingrad. For the offensive, the enemy chose the “Kursk Salient” - a section of the front formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. The plan of the Hitlerite command was to encircle and destroy a group of Red Army troops with converging attacks from the areas of Orel and Belgorod and again develop an offensive against Moscow. The operation was codenamed "Citadel".

Thanks to the actions of Soviet intelligence, the enemy's plans became known to the headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was decided to build a long-term defense in the depths of the Kursk salient, wear down the enemy in battles and then go on the offensive. In the north of the Kursk salient there were troops of the Central Front (commanded by Army General K.K. Rokossovsky), in the south by troops of the Voronezh Front (commanded by Army General N.F. Vatutin). In the rear of these fronts there was a powerful reserve - the Steppe Front under the command of Army General I.S. Koneva. Marshals A.M. were assigned to coordinate the actions of the fronts on the Kursk salient. Vasilevsky and G.K. Zhukov.

The number of Red Army troops in defense was 1 million 273 thousand people, 3,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 20,000 guns and mortars, 2,650 combat aircraft.

The German command concentrated more than 900,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 10,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 aircraft around the Kursk salient.

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the enemy launched an offensive. Fierce fighting broke out on the ground and in the air. At the cost of huge losses, the fascist German troops managed to advance 10–15 km north of Kursk. Particularly heavy fighting took place in the Oryol direction in the area of ​​the Ponyri station, which participants in the events called “Stalingrad of the Battle of Kursk.” Here a powerful battle took place between the shock units of three German tank divisions with formations of Soviet troops: the 2nd Tank Army (commanded by Lieutenant General A. Rodin) and the 13th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov). In these battles, junior lieutenant V. Bolshakov performed a feat, covering the embrasure of an enemy firing point with his body. Sniper I.S. Mudretsova replaced the incapacitated commander in battle, but was also seriously wounded. She was rightfully considered one of the best snipers in the army, destroying 140 Nazis.

In the Belgorod direction, south of Kursk, as a result of fierce fighting, the enemy advanced 20–35 km. But then his advance was stopped. On July 12, near Prokhorovka, on a field of approximately 7 by 5 km, the largest counter tank battle of the Second World War took place, in which about 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. The unprecedented battle lasted 18 hours in a row and subsided only long after midnight. In this battle, the Wehrmacht tank columns were defeated and retreated from the battlefield, losing more than 400 tanks and assault guns, including 70 new heavy Tiger tanks. For the next three days, the Nazis rushed to Prokhorovka, but were unable to break through or bypass it. As a result, the Germans were forced to withdraw the elite SS tank division "Totenkopf" from the front line. G. Hoth's tank army lost half of its personnel and vehicles. Success in the battles near Prokhorovka belongs to the troops of the 5th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov, who also suffered heavy losses.

During the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation achieved strategic air supremacy and maintained it until the end of the war. Il-2 attack aircraft, which widely used the new PTAB-2.5 anti-tank bombs, were especially helpful in the fight against German tanks. The French Normandie-Niemen squadron under the command of Major Jean-Louis Tulian fought courageously alongside the Soviet pilots. In heavy battles in the Belgorod direction, the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General I.S., distinguished themselves. Konev.

On July 12, the Red Army counteroffensive began. Troops of the Bryansk, Central and parts of the Western fronts went on the offensive against the enemy’s Oryol grouping (Operation Kutuzov), during which the city of Oryol was liberated on August 5. On August 3, the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation began (Operation Rumyantsev). Belgorod was liberated on August 5, Kharkov was liberated on August 23.

On August 5, 1943, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin in Moscow was given the first artillery salute in the Great Patriotic War. On August 23, Moscow again saluted the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in honor of the liberation of Kharkov. Since then, every major new victory of the Red Army began to be celebrated with fireworks.

Operation Citadel was the last offensive operation of the German Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front in World War II. From now on, the fascist German troops forever switched to defensive actions in battles against the Red Army. In the Battle of Kursk, 30 enemy divisions were defeated, the Wehrmacht lost more than 500,000 people killed and wounded, 1,500 tanks and assault guns, about 3,100 guns and mortars, and over 3,700 combat aircraft. The losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk amounted to 254,470 people killed and 608,833 people wounded and sick.

In the battles on the Kursk Bulge, soldiers and officers of the Red Army showed courage, perseverance and mass heroism. 132 formations and units received the guards rank, 26 units were awarded the honorary names “Oryol”, “Belgorod”, “Kharkov”, etc. More than 110 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 180 people received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory in the Battle of Kursk and the advance of the Red Army troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the Second World War in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army began an offensive along the entire front from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. At the end of September 1943, Red Army troops reached the Dnieper and began crossing it without an operational pause. This thwarted the German command’s plan to delay Soviet troops on the Dnieper using the “Eastern Wall” system of defensive fortifications on the right bank of the river.

The defending enemy group consisted of 1 million 240 thousand people, 2,100 tanks and assault guns, 12,600 guns and mortars, and 2,100 combat aircraft.

The Red Army troops on the Dnieper amounted to 2 million 633 thousand people, 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 51,200 guns and mortars, 2,850 combat aircraft. Warriors of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, and Southwestern Fronts, using available means - pontoons, boats, boats, rafts, barrels, planks, under artillery fire and enemy bombing, crossed a powerful water barrier. During September–October 1943, Red Army troops, having crossed the river and breaking through the defenses of the Eastern Wall, captured 23 bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper. Fighting fiercely, Soviet troops liberated Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, on November 6, 1943. The entire Left Bank and part of the Right Bank Ukraine were also liberated.

Tens of thousands of soldiers and officers of the Red Army showed examples of courage and bravery these days. For the exploits accomplished during the crossing of the Dnieper, 2,438 soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

August 23 is celebrated as the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The Red Army was led to this important victory by almost two months of intense and bloody battles, the outcome of which was not at all predetermined. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it in a little more detail.

Fact 1

The salient in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February–March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of Kursk

Fact 2

The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of World War II, not only because of the scale of the fighting that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. Victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. This means that from now on we are advancing. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November–December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if we attack, how large-scale tasks should we set ourselves? Both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.

Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent his report to Headquarters on possible military actions in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defense by destroying as many tanks as possible, and then bring in reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after it was discovered that Hitler's army was preparing for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense on the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge.

In a situation with a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to maintain the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops intended to attack decisively.

Construction of defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.

Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger group would attack in the Orel area against the Central Front. In reality, the southern group operating against the Voronezh Front turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was inaccurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation “Citadel” was the name of the German command’s plan to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies in the Kursk salient. It was planned to deliver converging attacks from the north from the Orel area and from the south from the Belgorod area. The impact wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Hoth's tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tank crews inspect a damaged Tiger

Fact 6

The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23–30) 1941 was larger in terms of the number of tanks participating. It occurred in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides fought at Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual new product was the “Goliath” wedges. This tracked self-propelled mine without a crew was controlled remotely via wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these wedges were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.

Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk

Battle of Kursk, 1943

Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) had been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense and then launch a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.

Since the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany has launched intense preparations for the offensive. The Nazis established mass production of new medium and heavy tanks and increased the production of guns, mortars and combat aircraft compared to 1942. Due to total mobilization, they almost completely made up for the losses suffered in personnel.

The fascist German command decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk salient with powerful counter strikes from the areas of Orel and Belgorod to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat Soviet troops in the Donbass. To carry out the operation near Kursk, called “Citadel,” the enemy concentrated enormous forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, among others. 16 tanks, Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group South (commander Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, the enemy strike forces included over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft. An important place in the enemy's plan was given to the use of new military equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).

The Soviet command countered the offensive of fascist German troops against the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, which began on July 5, 1943, with a strong active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to wedge 10-12 km into the defense of the Soviet troops. The group advancing on Kursk from the south advanced 35 km, but did not reach its goal.

On July 12, Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place (up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K. K. Rokossovsky should were to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 Rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 motorized tank divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South (commander - Field Marshal General E. Manstein).

The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most likely direction of action for the enemy's main forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary forces. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and assets in the direction of the expected enemy attack made it possible to create high densities in the 13th Army zone (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of front.

The commander of the Voronezh Front determined that the enemy’s attack could be in the directions of Belgorod and Oboyan; Belgorod, Korocha; Volchansk, Novy Oskol. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. Unlike the Central Front, the first-echelon armies received wide defense zones. However, even here, in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, the density of anti-tank artillery was 15.6 guns per 1 km of front, and taking into account the assets located in the second echelon of the front, up to 30 guns per 1 km of front.

Based on our intelligence data and the testimony of prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. Early in the morning of this day, artillery counter-preparation, planned in the fronts and armies, was carried out on the Voronezh and central fronts. As a result, it was possible to delay the enemy’s advance for 1.5 - 2 hours and somewhat weaken his initial blow.

On the morning of July 5, the Oryol enemy group, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to Olkhovatka, and auxiliary blows to Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Our troops met the enemy with exceptional resilience. The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. Only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.

In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, moved several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrage units to the main line, and the front commander moved howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Decisive counterattacks by tanks in cooperation with rifle units and artillery stopped the enemy’s advance. On this day, fierce battles also broke out in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions his attacks were unsuccessful.

Having determined the direction of the enemy's main efforts, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. The 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 2nd Tank Army of General A.G. Rodin and the 19th Tank Corps were involved in the counterattack. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense and, having suffered heavy losses, was unable to continue the offensive in all three directions in the following days. After the counterattack, the 2nd Tank Army and the 19th Tank Corps went on the defensive behind the second line, which strengthened the position of the troops of the Central Front.

On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha; The main blows were taken by the 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Army and 1st Tank Army.

Having failed to achieve success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy launched an attack on Ponyri on the morning of July 7, where the 307th Rifle Division was defending. During the day she repelled eight attacks. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M.A. Enshin, concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then launched a counterattack with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10, against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted.

Having exhausted their reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.

German soldiers in front of a Tiger tank, during the Battle of Kursk in June-July 1943

The enemy also launched a general offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front on the morning of July 5, delivering the main attack with the forces of the 4th Tank Army on Oboyan, and with the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. The fighting became especially fierce in the Oboyan direction. In the first half of the day, the commander of the 6th Guards Army, General I.M. Chistyakov, moved to the first line of defense part of the anti-tank artillery brigade, two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and a tank brigade. By the end of the day, the troops of this army inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main line of our defense was broken through only in certain areas. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to cross the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and seize a small bridgehead.

In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he moved the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army, to the second line of defense. In addition, the army was reinforced with front-line artillery.

On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. In the Oboyan direction, he repeatedly launched attacks from 150 to 400 tanks, but each time he met powerful fire from infantry, artillery and tanks. Only towards the end of the day did he manage to break into the second line of our defense.

On that day, in the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to complete the breakthrough of the main defense line, but its further advance was stopped.

Heavy German tanks "Tiger" (Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I") at the attack line, south of Orel. Battle of Kursk, mid-July 1943

On July 7 and 8, the Nazis, bringing fresh reserves into the battle, again tried to break through to Oboyan, expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen it in the direction of Prokhorovka. Up to 300 enemy tanks were rushing to the northeast. However, all enemy attempts were paralyzed by the active actions of the 10th and 2nd Tank Corps, advanced from the reserves of the Headquarters to the Prokhorovka area, as well as by the active actions of the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. In the Korochan direction, enemy attacks were also repulsed. The counterattack carried out on July 8 by formations of the 40th Army on the left flank of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army, and by units of the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its left flank, significantly eased the position of our troops in the Oboyan direction.

From July 9 to July 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. The front command promptly deployed part of its artillery to help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies. In addition, to cover the Oboyan direction, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped from the Prokhorovka area and the main aviation forces were targeted, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. Through the joint efforts of ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.

SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf", Kursk, 1943.

There was clearly a crisis brewing in the enemy's offensive. Therefore, the chairman of the Supreme Command headquarters, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N. F. Vatutin, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army of General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the goal of the final defeat of the wedged enemy group. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.

On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events took place in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (on the Belgorod - Kursk line, 56 km north of Belgorod), where the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf ") and the Soviet troops that launched a counterattack (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army). On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Air support for the enemy strike force was provided by aviation from Army Group South. Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation (about 1,300 sorties were carried out). During the day of battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Having failed to achieve the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy (advanced on the southern front of the Kursk ledge to a maximum of 35 km) went on the defensive.

On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Hitler's command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18 and the Steppe fronts began to pursue the enemy and by the end of July 23 they had mostly reached the line they occupied at the beginning of the defensive battle.

Source: I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander, 1943-1945", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1989.

The Oryol salient was defended by the troops of the 2nd Tank and 9th Field Armies, which were part of the Center group. They consisted of 27 infantry, 10 tank and motorized divisions. Here the enemy created a strong defense, the tactical zone of which consisted of two stripes with a total depth of 12 - 15 km. They had a developed system of trenches, communication passages and a large number of armored firing points. A number of intermediate defensive lines were prepared in the operational depth. The total depth of its defense on the Oryol bridgehead reached 150 km.

The Oryol group of the enemy was ordered by the Supreme Command Headquarters to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the main forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts. The idea of ​​the operation was to cut the enemy group into separate parts and destroy it using counter strikes from the north, east and south in the general direction of Oryol.

The Western Front (commanded by General V.D. Sokolovsky) received the task of delivering the main blow with the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, preventing the withdrawal of Nazi troops from Orel to the west and, in cooperation with other fronts, destroying them; with part of the forces, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, encircle and destroy the Bolkhov enemy group; carry out an auxiliary strike by troops of the 50th Army on Zhizdra.

The Bryansk Front (commanded by General M. M. Popov) was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil area to Orel, and a secondary blow with the forces of the 61st Army to Bolkhov.

The Central Front had the task of eliminating the wedged enemy group north of Olkhovatka, subsequently developing an attack on Kromy and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, completing the defeat of the enemy in the Oryol salient.

Preparations for the operation at the fronts were carried out taking into account the fact that they had to break through the enemy’s prepared and deeply echeloned defenses for the first time and develop tactical success at a high pace. For this purpose, a decisive massing of forces and means was carried out, the combat formations of troops were echeloned deeper, success development echelons were created in the armies, consisting of one or two tank corps, the offensive was to be carried out day and night.

For example, with the total width of the 11th Guards Army's offensive zone being 36 km, a decisive massing of forces and assets was achieved in the 14-kilometer breakthrough area, which ensured an increase in operational-tactical densities. The average artillery density in the army breakthrough area reached 185, and in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 232 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. If the divisions' offensive zones in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad fluctuated within 5 km, then in the 8th Guards Rifle Regiment they were narrowed to 2 km. What was new compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was that the battle formation of rifle corps, divisions, regiments and battalions was formed, as a rule, in two and sometimes in three echelons. This ensured an increase in the force of the strike from the depths and the timely development of the emerging success.

Characteristic of the use of artillery was the creation in armies of destruction and long-range artillery groups, groups of guards mortars and anti-aircraft artillery groups. The artillery training schedule in some armies began to include a period of shooting and destruction.

There have been changes in the use of tanks. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were included in the tank groups for direct support of infantry (NTS), which were supposed to advance behind the tanks and support their actions with the fire of their guns. Moreover, in some armies, NPP tanks were assigned not only to the rifle divisions of the first, but also to the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps constituted mobile army groups, and tank armies were intended to be used for the first time as mobile groups of fronts.

The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th Air Armies (commanded by Generals M.M. Gromov, N.F. Naumenko, S.I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, and also long-range aviation.

Aviation was entrusted with the following tasks: to cover the troops of strike groups of the fronts during the preparation and conduct of operations; suppress resistance centers at the front line and in the immediate depths and disrupt the enemy command and control system for the period of aviation training; from the beginning of the attack, continuously accompany the infantry and tanks; ensure the introduction of tank formations into battle and their operations in operational depth; fight against suitable enemy reserves.

The counter-offensive was preceded by a lot of preparatory work. On all fronts, the initial areas for the offensive were well equipped, troops were regrouped, and large reserves of material and technical resources were created. A day before the offensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the fronts by the forward battalions, which made it possible to clarify the true outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, and in some areas to capture the front trench.

On the morning of July 12, after powerful air and artillery preparation, which lasted about three hours, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By mid-day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan), thanks to the timely entry into battle of the second echelons of rifle regiments and separate tank brigades, broke through the main enemy defense line and crossed the Fomina River. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical zone, on the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Tank Corps was introduced into the battle in the direction of Bolkhov. On the morning of the second day of the operation, the second echelons of rifle corps entered the battle, which, together with tank units, bypassing strong enemy strongholds, with the active support of artillery and aviation, completed the breakthrough of the second line of its defense by mid-July 13.

After completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and its 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the advanced detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it on the move, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.

In this situation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped the 36th Guards Rifle Corps from the left flank of the army and moved here the 25th Tank Corps, transferred from the front reserve. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced up to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the Bolkhov enemy group from the southwest.

In order to develop the operation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters strengthened the western front with the 11th Army (commanded by General I. I. Fedyuninsky). After a long march, on July 20, an incomplete army was immediately introduced into battle at the junction between the 50th and 11th Guards armies in the direction of Khvostovichi. In five days, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy and advanced 15 km.

In order to completely defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, the commander of the Western Front in the middle of the day on July 26 brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Headquarters reserve (commander General V.M. Badanov).

Having an operational formation in two echelons, the 4th Tank Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, launched an offensive on Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. Through its actions, the 4th Tank Army contributed to the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front in the liberation of Bolkhov.

On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front (11th Guards, 4th Tank, 11th Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) in connection with the preparation of the Smolensk offensive operation were transferred to the subordination of the Bryansk Front.

The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.

The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies, with the 1st Guards Tank Corps introduced into the battle in the middle of the second day of the offensive, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone by the end of July 13. By July 18, they approached the Oleshnya River, where they encountered fierce enemy resistance at the rear defensive line.

In order to speed up the defeat of the enemy's Oryol group, the Supreme High Command Headquarters transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commanded by General P. S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th Air Armies and long-range aviation, it went on the offensive from the Bogdanovo, Podmaslovo line and, repelling strong counterattacks of the enemy, by the end of the day broke through its defenses on the Oleshnya River. On the night of July 20, the tank army, having regrouped, struck in the direction of Otrada, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the Mtsensk enemy group. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army attacked Stanovoy Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day it was transferred to the Central Front.

The offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts forced the enemy to pull back part of the forces of the Oryol group from the Kursk direction and thereby created a favorable situation for the troops of the right wing of the Central Front to launch a counteroffensive. By July 18, they had restored their previous position and continued to advance in the direction of Krom.

By the end of July, troops on three fronts captured the enemy’s Oryol group from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, trying to prevent the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. Soviet troops began pursuit. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and by the morning of August 5 liberated it. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.

Having captured Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18 they reached the Zhizdra, Litizh line. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)

3. Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)

The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 contour around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.

The idea of ​​the Supreme High Command headquarters was to use powerful blows from troops from adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts to cut the opposing enemy group into two parts, subsequently deeply envelop it in the Kharkov region and, in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, destroy it.

The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, an auxiliary attack, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.

The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow with troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th armies from the area north-west of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, an auxiliary blow was delivered by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area south-east of Belgorod to west direction.

By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.

From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was ensured by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S.A. Krasovsky and S.K. Goryunov, respectively. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.

To achieve success in breaking through the enemy’s defenses, the command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts decisively massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. Thus, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front.

There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in armies, but also in corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in the art of war.

The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to operate in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodolov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation reach the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west.

Artillery and engineering support for the entry of tank armies into battle was assigned to the 5th Guards Army.

For aviation support, each tank army was allocated one assault and fighter aviation division.

In preparing for the operation, it was instructive to disinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began to bombard areas of false troop concentrations, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.

A special feature was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.

Hiding behind destroyed enemy tanks, the soldiers move forward, Belgorod direction, August 2, 1943.

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they had overcome the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12 - 26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance.

Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.

On August 4, troops of the 1st Tank Army from the Tomarovka area began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps, with reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by mid-day on August 6th. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Tank Corps liberated Bogodukhov.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing the enemy's centers of resistance from the west, struck at Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.

By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the strong enemy defense center of Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov group. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing an offensive in the southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift strike, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary group of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.

The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone on August 4, captured Belgorod by storm by the end of the next day, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the breakthrough front of our troops had reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.

Kislov Photos

The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka line by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I.A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tank crews, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repelling the fierce attacks of the Nazis who tried to capture them alive. Over two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Tank Army reached the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area.

Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. By this time, the troops of the Steppe Front had approached the outer defensive perimeter of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.

The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov group, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Death's Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Tank Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. An oncoming tank battle unfolded. During this, the enemy pushed back the formations of the 1st Tank Army by 3-4 km, but was unable to break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. It conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis, assisted combined arms and tank armies in repelling counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy’s counterattack from the south on Bogodukhov.

Tankers and machine gunners of the 15th Guards Mechanized Brigade advance on the city of Amvrosievka, August 23, 1943.

However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka area with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this enemy grouping, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st Tank Army from the Bogodukhov area, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. These forces, by striking the enemy’s flanks by the end of August 19, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrka group of Germans and completely defeated it.

At the same time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began the assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy tank "Panther" destroyed on the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, Belgorod region. 1943

Photo - A. Morkovkin

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy group. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.

Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass.

4. Main conclusions.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended in an outstanding victory for us. Irreversible losses were inflicted on the enemy, and all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov areas were thwarted.

The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment when our troops went on the offensive. It began in conditions when the main German attack groups suffered huge losses and a crisis was defined in their offensive. Success was also ensured by the skillful organization of strategic interaction between groups of fronts attacking in the western and southwestern, as well as in other directions. This did not allow the fascist German command to regroup troops in areas that were dangerous to it.

The success of the counteroffensive was greatly influenced by the large strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters previously created in the Kursk direction, which were used to develop the offensive of the fronts.

For the first time, Soviet troops solved the problem of breaking through the enemy’s previously prepared, deeply echeloned defense and subsequent development of operational success. This was achieved thanks to the creation of powerful strike groups in the fronts and armies, the massing of forces and means in breakthrough areas and the presence of tank formations in the fronts, and large tank (mechanized) formations in the armies.

Before the start of the counteroffensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out more widely than in previous operations, not only by reinforced companies, but also by advanced battalions.

During the counteroffensive, the fronts and armies gained experience in repelling counterattacks from large enemy tank formations. It was carried out with close cooperation between all branches of the military and aviation. In order to stop the enemy and defeat his advancing troops, fronts and armies with part of their forces switched to a tough defense while simultaneously delivering a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the enemy’s counterattack group. As a result of the increase in the number of military equipment and reinforcement means, the tactical densities of our troops in the counteroffensive near Kursk increased by 2 - 3 times in comparison with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

What was new in the field of offensive combat tactics was the transition of units and formations from single-echelon to deeply echeloned combat formations. This turned out to be possible due to the narrowing of their sectors and offensive zones.

In the counteroffensive near Kursk, the methods of using military branches and aviation were improved. On a larger scale, tank and mechanized troops were used. The density of NPP tanks compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad increased and amounted to 15 - 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front. However, when breaking through a strong, deeply layered enemy defense, such densities turned out to be insufficient. Tank and mechanized corps became the main means of developing the success of combined arms armies, and tank armies of a homogeneous composition became the echelon for developing the success of the front. Their use to complete the breakthrough of a previously prepared positional defense was a necessary measure, often leading to significant tank losses and weakening of tank formations and formations, but in specific conditions the situation justified itself. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were widely used near Kursk. Experience has shown that they were an effective means of supporting the advance of tanks and infantry.

There were also peculiarities in the use of artillery: the density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack increased significantly; the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of support for the attack was eliminated; army artillery groups by number of corps

The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted 50 days. As a result of this operation, the strategic initiative finally passed to the side of the Red Army and until the end of the war it was carried out mainly in the form of offensive actions on its part. On the day of the 75th anniversary of the start of the legendary battle, the website of the Zvezda TV channel collected ten little-known facts about the Battle of Kursk. 1. Initially the battle was not planned as offensive When planning the spring-summer military campaign of 1943, the Soviet command faced a difficult choice: which method of action to prefer - to attack or defend. In their reports on the situation in the Kursk Bulge area, Zhukov and Vasilevsky proposed to bleed the enemy in a defensive battle and then launch a counteroffensive. A number of military leaders opposed it - Vatutin, Malinovsky, Timoshenko, Voroshilov - but Stalin supported the decision to defend, fearing that as a result of our offensive the Nazis would be able to break through the front line. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when.

“The actual course of events showed that the decision on deliberate defense was the most rational type of strategic action,” emphasizes military historian, candidate of historical sciences Yuri Popov.

2. The number of troops in the battle exceeded the scale of the Battle of Stalingrad The Battle of Kursk is still considered one of the largest battles of World War II. More than four million people were involved in it on both sides (for comparison: during the Battle of Stalingrad, just over 2.1 million people participated at various stages of the fighting). According to the General Staff of the Red Army, during the offensive alone from July 12 to August 23, 35 German divisions were defeated, including 22 infantry, 11 tank and two motorized. The remaining 42 divisions suffered heavy losses and largely lost their combat effectiveness. In the Battle of Kursk, the German command used 20 tank and motorized divisions out of a total of 26 divisions available at that time on the Soviet-German front. After Kursk, 13 of them were completely destroyed. 3. Information about the enemy’s plans was promptly received from intelligence officers from abroad Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparations of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge. Foreign residencies obtained information in advance about Germany’s preparations for the spring-summer campaign of 1943. Thus, on March 22, GRU resident in Switzerland Sandor Rado reported that “...an attack on Kursk may involve using the SS tank corps (an organization banned in the Russian Federation - approx. edit.), which is currently receiving replenishment." And intelligence officers in England (GRU resident Major General I. A. Sklyarov) obtained an analytical report prepared for Churchill, “Assessment of possible German intentions and actions in the Russian campaign of 1943.”

“The Germans will concentrate forces to eliminate the Kursk salient,” the document said.

Thus, the information obtained by the scouts in early April revealed in advance the plan of the enemy’s summer campaign and made it possible to forestall the enemy’s attack. 4. The Kursk Bulge became a large-scale baptism of fire for Smersh The counterintelligence agencies "Smersh" were formed in April 1943 - three months before the start of the historic battle. "Death to spies!" - Stalin so succinctly and at the same time succinctly defined the main task of this special service. But the Smershevites not only reliably protected units and formations of the Red Army from enemy agents and saboteurs, but also, which was used by the Soviet command, conducted radio games with the enemy, carried out combinations to bring German agents to our side. The book “The Arc of Fire”: The Battle of Kursk through the eyes of Lubyanka,” published based on materials from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia, talks about a whole series of operations by security officers during that period.
Thus, in order to misinform the German command, the Smersh department of the Central Front and the Smersh department of the Oryol Military District conducted a successful radio game “Experience”. It lasted from May 1943 to August 1944. The work of the radio station was legendary on behalf of the reconnaissance group of Abwehr agents and misled the German command about the plans of the Red Army, including in the Kursk region. In total, 92 radiograms were transmitted to the enemy, 51 were received. Several German agents were called to our side and neutralized, and cargo dropped from the plane was received (weapons, money, fictitious documents, uniforms). . 5. On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality What is considered to be the largest battle of armored vehicles of the entire Second World War began near this settlement. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The Wehrmacht had superiority over the Red Army due to the greater efficiency of its equipment. Let's say the T-34 had only a 76-mm cannon, and the T-70 had a 45-mm gun. The Churchill III tanks, received by the USSR from England, had a 57-millimeter gun, but this vehicle was characterized by low speed and poor maneuverability. In turn, the German heavy tank T-VIH "Tiger" had an 88-mm cannon, with a shot from which it penetrated the armor of the thirty-four at a distance of up to two kilometers.
Our tank could penetrate armor 61 millimeters thick at a distance of a kilometer. By the way, the frontal armor of the same T-IVH reached a thickness of 80 millimeters. It was possible to fight with hope of success in such conditions only in close combat, which was used, however, at the cost of heavy losses. Nevertheless, at Prokhorovka, the Wehrmacht lost 75% of its tank resources. For Germany, such losses were a disaster and proved difficult to recover almost until the very end of the war. 6. General Katukov’s cognac did not reach the Reichstag During the Battle of Kursk, for the first time during the war, the Soviet command used large tank formations in echelon to hold a defensive line on a wide front. One of the armies was commanded by Lieutenant General Mikhail Katukov, the future twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Armored Forces. Subsequently, in his book “At the Edge of the Main Strike,” he, in addition to the difficult moments of his front-line epic, also recalled one funny incident related to the events of the Battle of Kursk.

“In June 1941, after leaving the hospital, on the way to the front I dropped into a store and bought a bottle of cognac, deciding that I would drink it with my comrades as soon as I achieved my first victory over the Nazis,” the front-line soldier wrote. - Since then, this treasured bottle has traveled with me on all fronts. And finally the long-awaited day has arrived. We arrived at the checkpoint. The waitress quickly fried the eggs, and I took a bottle out of my suitcase. We sat down with our comrades at a simple wooden table. They poured cognac, which brought back pleasant memories of peaceful pre-war life. And the main toast - “For victory! To Berlin!”

7. Kozhedub and Maresyev crushed the enemy in the sky above Kursk During the Battle of Kursk, many Soviet soldiers showed heroism.

“Every day of fighting gave many examples of courage, bravery, and perseverance of our soldiers, sergeants and officers,” notes retired Colonel General Alexei Kirillovich Mironov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War. “They consciously sacrificed themselves, trying to prevent the enemy from passing through their defense sector.”

Over 100 thousand participants in those battles were awarded orders and medals, 231 became Hero of the Soviet Union. 132 formations and units received the guards rank, and 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. Future three times Hero of the Soviet Union. Alexey Maresyev also took part in the battles. On July 20, 1943, during an air battle with superior enemy forces, he saved the lives of two Soviet pilots by destroying two enemy FW-190 fighters at once. On August 24, 1943, the deputy squadron commander of the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant A.P. Maresyev, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 8. Defeat at the Battle of Kursk came as a shock to Hitler After the failure at the Kursk Bulge, the Fuhrer was furious: he lost his best formations, not yet knowing that in the fall he would have to leave the entire Left Bank Ukraine. Without betraying his character, Hitler immediately laid the blame for the Kursk failure on the field marshals and generals who exercised direct command of the troops. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

“This was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With its failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive, turning point in the war on the Eastern Front."

A German historian from the military-historical department of the Bundeswehr, Manfred Pay, wrote:

“The irony of history is that Soviet generals began to assimilate and develop the art of operational leadership of troops, which was highly appreciated by the German side, and the Germans themselves, under pressure from Hitler, switched to Soviet positions of tough defense - according to the principle “at all costs.”

By the way, the fate of the elite SS tank divisions that took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge - “Leibstandarte”, “Totenkopf” and “Reich” - later turned out even more sad. All three formations took part in battles with the Red Army in Hungary, were defeated, and the remnants made their way into the American zone of occupation. However, the SS tank crews were handed over to the Soviet side, and they were punished as war criminals. 9. The victory at Kursk brought the opening of the Second Front closer As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the disintegration of the fascist bloc began - the Mussolini regime collapsed, Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force in the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. In August 1943, the US Committee of Chiefs of Staff prepared an analytical document in which it assessed the role of the USSR in the war.

“Russia occupies a dominant position,” the report noted, “and is a decisive factor in the impending defeat of the Axis countries in Europe.”

It is no coincidence that President Roosevelt realized the danger of further delaying the opening of the Second Front. On the eve of the Tehran Conference he told his son:

“If things in Russia continue to progress as they are now, then perhaps next spring the Second Front will not be needed.”

It is interesting that a month after the end of the Battle of Kursk, Roosevelt already had his own plan for the dismemberment of Germany. He presented it just at the conference in Tehran. 10. For the fireworks in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, the entire supply of blank shells in Moscow was used up During the Battle of Kursk, two key cities of the country were liberated - Orel and Belgorod. Joseph Stalin ordered an artillery salute to be held on this occasion in Moscow - the first in the entire war. It was estimated that in order for the fireworks to be heard throughout the city, about 100 anti-aircraft guns would need to be deployed. There were such fire weapons, but the organizers of the ceremonial event had at their disposal only 1,200 blank shells (during the war they were not kept in reserve at the Moscow Air Defense Garrison). Therefore, out of 100 guns, only 12 salvos could be fired. True, the Kremlin mountain cannon division (24 guns) was also involved in the salute, blank shells for which were available. However, the effect of the action may not have been as expected. The solution was to increase the interval between salvos: at midnight on August 5, all 124 guns were fired every 30 seconds. And so that the fireworks could be heard everywhere in Moscow, groups of guns were placed in stadiums and vacant lots in different areas of the capital.